Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 1

Article 5

11-1-2010

The Law of Citations and Seriatim Opinions: Were the Ancient
Romans and the Early Supreme Court on the Right Track?
Joshua M. Austin

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Joshua M. Austin, The Law of Citations and Seriatim Opinions: Were the Ancient Romans and the Early
Supreme Court on the Right Track?, 31 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 19 (2010).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

The Law of Citations and Seriatim Opinions:
Were the Ancient Romans and the Early
Supreme Court on the Right Track?
JOSHUA M. AUSTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 19
II. THE LAW OF CITATIONS ....................................................................... 21
A. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE LAW OF CITATIONS ........................... 21
B. THE FIVE JURISTS ............................................................................ 24
1.
Gaius................................................................................. 24
2.
Modestinus ........................................................................ 24
3.
Papinian............................................................................ 25
4.
Paul................................................................................... 25
5.
Ulpian ............................................................................... 26
III. SERIATIM OPINIONS.............................................................................. 26
A. THE EARLY SUPREME COURT AND SERIATIM OPINIONS ................. 26
B. THE END OF SERIATIM OPINIONS .................................................... 27
IV. ENGLAND AND THE CONTINUED PRACTICE OF SEPARATE OPINIONS .. 29
V. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND HIS THOUGHTS ON MULTIPLE
OPINIONS .............................................................................................. 30
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDITIONAL RATIONALES ................................ 32
A. EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT HISTORICAL CONCURRENCES .............. 32
B. EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT HISTORICAL DISSENTS ......................... 33
VII.CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 35

I.

INTRODUCTION

“A house divided against itself cannot stand.”1 While this phrase is
well known, perhaps there are times when it misses the mark. Perhaps there
are situations in which a “divided house” leads one down a path of enligh*
J.D., Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.A., Illinois State University. Mr. Austin would like to thank his wife Cassandra, and his son, Holden, for always standing by his side. Mr.
Austin would also like to thank Professor Daniel Reynolds of Northern Illinois University College of
Law for his insight and guidance during the creation and fine-tuning of this article.

1.
While accepting the Republican nomination for one of the United States Senate
seats in the state of Illinois, Abraham Lincoln uttered this famous sentence, a biblical admonition, before more than 1,000 Republican delegates in Springfield, Illinois on June 16,
1858. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 206 (1996).
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tenment. While a nation torn in half by slavery was, indeed, in desperate
need of a uniting force,2 occasionally, a differing view can lead to such a
fundamental change that the legal system is changed forever.
Perhaps this was the idea behind the earliest view of the United States
Supreme Court3 and one of the earliest views on judicial systems altogether.4 The ancient Romans, in the fifth century, created the Lex Citandi, or,
the Law of Citations.5 The theory was relatively simple; authority was given to the writings of five important jurists of the classical period of Roman
law, and the opinion deemed correct was that of the majority.6 And while
some have deemed this the “low point of Roman jurisprudence,”7 this
Comment postulates that the ancient Romans were on the right track; it was
simply their utilization of the concept, not the concept itself that missed the
mark.
Similarly, the early Supreme Court of the United States began with the
issuing of seriatim, or separate, opinions by each of the Justices hearing the
case.8 While this practice was ultimately halted by John Marshall upon his
rise to Chief Justice,9 perhaps this idea was also strikingly close to necessity
in order for the Court to function to its maximum effectiveness.
This Comment discusses the Law of Citations and seriatim opinions. It
contends that the ancient Romans were on to something much more lasting
than the Lex Citandi itself. The concept of separate opinions, and an ability
for differing thoughts, while perhaps in the minority at one time, possess
the ability to eventually seize control and become the majority opinion on a
subject. The Supreme Court’s seriatim opinions, and modern concurrences
and dissents, served, and continue to serve, the same fundamental purpose.

2. Id.
3. The early Supreme Court used seriatim, or separate, opinions penned by each
Justice hearing a case, a practice ceased by John Marshall upon his appointment to the position of Chief Justice. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 779-80 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
4. As early as the fifth century, the ancient Romans used the idea of separate opinions to facilitate a system of justice by way of the Law of Citations. ALAN WATSON, THE
LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 90-91 (1970).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 91. A legal historian, Watson stated that the “Law of Citations marks a
low point of Roman jurisprudence, since [it declares] the correct opinion is to be found by
counting heads, not by choosing the best solution.” Id.
8. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 3, at 779-80. This practice was, at least in part, guided by “English legal traditions in effect at the time of American independence,” and, in England, still common usage
today. Id.
9. Id.
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This Comment begins with a historical look at the Law of Citations
and the importance of its timing within Roman law,10 as well as a brief discussion of the five jurists whose works were relied upon by this rule of
law.11 This Comment will then discuss seriatim opinions from the early
Supreme Court,12 and their ultimate demise.13 Then, this Comment will
briefly discuss the continued use of separate opinions by the country whose
legal system most influenced that of the United States—England—and
theorize that this continued use, in part, shows the necessity of multiple
rationales and opinions.14 Next, this Comment will look at recent commentary made by current Chief Justice John Roberts, expressing a dislike for
the many concurring and dissenting opinions in current Supreme Court opinions.15 Finally, this Comment will discuss important concurrences16 and
dissents17 in Supreme Court cases in an effort to dispel the fears of Chief
Justice Roberts, and argue that the Law of Citations and seriatim opinions
were the earliest manifestations of these important concepts, and, while
perhaps not properly executed, paved the way for these concurrences and
dissents.18
II.
A.

THE LAW OF CITATIONS

A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE LAW OF CITATIONS

The Lex Citandi, or Law of Citations, was created by Theodosius II in
426 CE.19 It was the culmination of legislation that had been emphasizing
the importance and popularity of five jurists from the classical period of
Roman law: Gaius, Modestinus, Papinian, Paul, and Ulpian.20 The writings
of these jurists were declared authoritative.21
Much of the popularity of these jurists arose out of the fact that there
had been a “long lapse of time since the writings of the great jurists of the
second century” and the subsequent rising of “many differences of opinion

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part VII.
WATSON, supra note 4, at 91.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
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among later jurists . . . .”22 There began to be discord as to which jurists
were authoritative, or deserved the most weight or value in deciding cases.23
Additionally, there existed two formal sources of law, the ius24 and the leges.25 Both forms of the law were spread among many archives and were
thus difficult to consult.26 This was another backdrop to the Law of Citations, which was one of the first major attempts to “simplify the ius and
organize the leges.”27 Ultimately, “Theodosius published a constitution
ordering that the writings of Papinian, Paul[], Gaius, Ulpian, and Modestinus, together with the writings of all other jurists quoted by them as authority, should have the effect of law, and should be followed by the courts.”28
In the event of a disagreement among the five jurists as to a particular
question of law, the majority of their opinions ruled on the matter.29 If there
was a tie among the jurists, “the opinion of Papinian, if expressed” in the
matter, was controlling.30 The only occasion under which “the judge hearing the case [was to] exercise his31 own discretion” was if there was a tie
among the jurists, and Papinian was silent.32
While, as stated earlier, this has been viewed by some as the low point
of Roman jurisprudence,33 it is not viewed entirely in the negative by legal
scholars and historians.34 For instance, Alan Watson said of the Law of
Citations:
But things were not so bad as is sometimes thought. The
possibility of future development was not excluded, at least
22. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO
MODERN LAW 148 (1938).
23. Id. at 148-49.
24.
“The ius formed a coherent entity and consisted of the texts of the classical
jurists.” J.H.A. Lokin & Bernard H. Stolte, Byzantium: Early Byzantium, in THE OXFORD
INTERNATIONAL ENCYLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 327 (e-reference edition) (Stanley N. Katz
ed., 2009) (on file with author).
25.
“The leges were the constitutions enacted by the emperors. Amendments could
only be made in the form of new constitutions. Each constitution was, in principle, enacted
by all reigning emperors.” Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 149.
29. See id.; WATSON, supra note 4, at 91.
30. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 149; WATSON, supra note 4, at 91.
31.
Throughout this Comment, in instances where a female or male pronoun or
possessive might be appropriate, the male counterpart will routinely be used when referencing an individual in history, in light of the fact that—in this historical context—the positions
referred to throughout this Comment were restricted to men only until fairly recently by
historical timelines.
32. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 149; WATSON, supra note 4, at 91.
33. WATSON, supra note 4, at 91.
34. Id.
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not for new situations or when the law had been or would
be changed by legislation. Indeed, the Law of Citations
compares favorably with the modern strict doctrine of
precedent in Anglo-American law under which a court is
bound by a decision of a higher court, regardless of whether at that time the court was composed of undistinguished
men or had reached its decision by illogical arguments.35
Unfortunate for the Law of Citations was its place in the timeline of
Roman history, as well as the attitude permeating the post-classical period
of Roman law. During the third and fourth centuries, Roman law began a
decline, during which no new noteworthy jurists came to be, and the study
of law took a back seat to theology and different attractions.36 “The center
of empire moved from Rome to the Greek East, where intellectual traditions
were different and law did not have the same fascination.”37 Additionally,
in 325 CE, Christianity became the official religion of the empire, and thus
theology became the premier study for learned men.38
In addition to this decline, the attitude of the post-classical period has
affected the Law of Citations as well. The post-classical period of Roman
law was “marked by the effort to keep what had previously been gained, not
by any attempt to make further progress.”39 Thus the Law of Citations is
commonly viewed in the same light as a decline in the advancement of
Roman law, particularly in light of the fact that most of what happened in
Roman law after the Law of Citations was little more than an organization
of the ius and the leges40 and the development of canon law.41
Nonetheless, the Law of Citations was quite possibly the first identification of the power of multiple viewpoints and rationales behind a decision,
and thus is an important part of legal history. In light of this importance, it
is necessary to briefly identify the five jurists whom were considered so
important that their combined works controlled Roman law for a period of
time.

35. Id. As should be apparent, Watson takes a somewhat cynical view of the hard
and fast rules of precedent adopted in the United States court system, but he was generous
enough to further state of the Law of Citations that it “at least [had] the merit of singling out
the best jurists to be followed.” Id. Maybe in Watson’s view, the ancient Romans, unlike
lawyers today, did not have to follow “undistinguished men” or decisions reached “by illogical arguments.” Id.
36. Id. at 90.
37. Id.
38. WATSON, supra note 4, at 90.
39. Id.
40. See Lokin & Stolte, supra note 24.
41. See id.
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“It is to Gaius that we owe the chief source of our knowledge of Roman law prior to the times of Justinian.”42 Little is known of Gaius the man,
rather, as Burdick noted, “the fact that he is mentioned only by a single
name, instead of two or three names common to well known Romans, has
been made the foundation for the suggestion that he was either a foreigner
or even a freedman.”43 “All we know about Gaius as a person is that he
lived in the second half of the second century . . . .”44
What is known of Gaius the jurist is that his Institutes had a great impact upon the Institutes of Justinian.45 Further, his impact on the Digest is
well documented.46 Following his death, Gaius went largely unnoticed for
the two centuries prior to the passing of the Law of Citations, at which time
he was chosen as one of the five authorities to be followed.47
2.

Modestinus

Herennius Modestinus (Modestinus) was another of the five jurists relied upon for the Law of Citations.48 Modestinus was a “pupil of both Papinian and Ulpian . . . .”49 He also authored “a number of legal works which
ranked among the foremost authorities.”50 Modestinus also wrote six books
on the law on exemptions from tutorship.51 His works earned him a place in
history in the Law of Citations.52

42. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 129.
43. Id.
44.
Gaivs Noster—Our Gaius: The Jack of Roman Law, http://www.harrisgreenwell.com/HGS/GaiusTheJackOfRomanLaw#fn1_7 (last visited April 13, 2010) (quoting OLGA TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 104 (1993)).
45. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 130. In fact the Justinian Institutes were copied
largely from the Institutes of Gaius. Id.
46. Id. (“Over five hundred quotations from Gaius are found in the Digest . . . .”).
47. See Gaivs Noster—Our Gaius: The Jack of Roman Law, supra note 44.
48. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW & COMPARATIVE LAW 82 (University of Georgia
Press 1991).
49. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 135.
50. Id.
51. WATSON, supra note 4, at 40.
52. See id. at 90.
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Papinian

“There never was, nor ever will be, a lawyer that excelled or can equal
Papinian.”53 Aemilius Paullus Papinianus (Papinian) is, perhaps, the most
well-known and most celebrated Roman jurist.54 Papinian was not only a
great scholar, but a “profound author”55 and a skilled lawyer.56 “From his
works there are five hundred and ninety-five extracts in the Digest . . . .”57
Additionally, Papinian counts three of the other five jurists relied upon for
the Law of Citations as his pupils, Ulpian, Paulus, and Modestinus.58
Papinian is credited with having authored sixty-three books, as well as
sixty-seven rescripts, in the name of—then emperor—Septimius Severus.59
Despite these works, it is his “casuistic works” for which he is better
known.60 Specifically, he is best known for “his thirty-seven books of Problems (Quaestiones),” which discussed cases derived from experiences Papinian had.61 Further, as stated previously, so respected was Papinian that his
works were the “tie-breaker,” should such a situation arise, under the rules
of the Law of Citations.62
4.

Paul

Julius Paulus (Paul) was a contemporary of Ulpian and a pupil of Papinian.63 Along with being a well-renowned jurist, Paul was a “praetor,
consul, and praetorian prefect.”64 The Digest “contains 2080 extracts from
his works. In fact, about a half of all the contents of the Digest is made up
from the writings of the two jurists, Ulpian and Paulus.”65
Paul also wrote a large number of casuistic works, much like Papinian,
for which he is also well known.66 Among these works were “twenty books
of problems (Quaestiones) devoted to the elucidation of doubtful points of
law” drawn from his experiences, and “twenty-three books of opinions
53. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 132 (quoting the French jurist, Cujacius).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 132.
59.
Tony Honoré, Papinian, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LEGAL HISTORY (e-reference edition) (Oxford University Press 2009) (on file with author).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 149; WATSON, supra note 4, at 91.
63. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 134.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66.
Honoré, supra note 59.
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(Responsa) drawn from his extensive practice.”67 Like the other jurists mentioned herein, Paul’s works were also chosen as authoritative for the Law of
Citations.68
5.

Ulpian

Domitus Ulpianus (Ulpian) was not only a renowned jurist, but was a
pupil of Papinian, served as a praetorian prefect, and was the chief adviser
of then emperor, Alexander Severus.69 “The Digest contains 2462 excerpts
from the writings of Ulpian, about one third of the subject matter of that
entire compilation.”70 In fact, Ulpian was quoted more in the Digest than
any other author.71
Ulpian wrote over two hundred books, as well as a great number of
imperial rescripts, for Septimus Severus while still ruling.72 It has been
noted that “[o]f all the Roman jurists whose work has survived, his lies
closest in style and method to contemporary legal writing.”73 Ulpian’s
works, too, were chosen as authoritative for the Law of Citations.74
III.
A.

SERIATIM OPINIONS

THE EARLY SUPREME COURT AND SERIATIM OPINIONS

The United States Supreme Court was established by Article III of the
United States Constitution.75 Article III not only created the Supreme Court,
it gave the Court original and appellate jurisdiction while limiting the Court
by “Exception” and “Regulations” passed by Congress.76 Congress decided
in 1789, with the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, on the basics of the
Court, including the creation of a Supreme Court of “six judges and a threetiered federal judicial structure.”77
As previously mentioned, “[c]onsistent with its legal ancestry, the Supreme Court initially adopted seriatim opinions as an accepted way of an67. Id.
68. WATSON, supra note 4, at 90-91.
69. BURDICK, supra note 22, at 134.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72.
Tony Honoré, supra note 59.
73. Id.
74. WATSON, supra note 4, at 90-91.
75. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
supra note 3, at 373.
76. U.S. CONST. art. III.
77. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
supra note 3, at 373.

OF THE

UNITED STATES,

OF THE

UNITED STATES,
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nouncing decisions.”78 The result of this action was to leave the Court with
no single controlling opinion.79 However, this served as a significant check
on the Supreme Court, and limited some of the authority that several saw as
overwhelming.80 As Thomas Jefferson noted, “The constitution, on this
hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they
may twist, and shape into any form they please.”81
However, it was not long before changes made by Lord Mansfield in
England82 would also cross the Atlantic, and Thomas Jefferson would be in
for a fight.83
B.

THE END OF SERIATIM OPINIONS

The impact in the United States of a denouncement of seriatim opinions by Lord Mansfield in England84 was first seen in Virginia at the court
of appeals.85 Chief Judge Edmund Pendleton did away with seriatim opinions, choosing for the judges to work in private before announcing a unified opinion.86 The Republican Party strongly criticized this practice, its
most outspoken proponent being none other than Thomas Jefferson.87 “Due
to this political pressure, upon the ascension of Judge Spencer Roane to
Judge Pendleton’s seat on the bench some years later, the practice ceased
and the tradition of seriatim opinions was quickly reinstated.”88
However, upon the appointment of John Marshall to the position of
Chief Justice, seriatim opinions would be done away with, this time for
good.89 Despite the fact that the other justices “were men of intellectual
independence, Marshall soon became a dominant force.”90 It was this influence by which he was able to convince the other justices to do away with
seriatim opinions.91
78. Id. at 780.
79. Id. at 607.
80. See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A
Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 304-05.
81. Id. at 305 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6,
1819), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135-40 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905)).
82. See infra Part IV.
83.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 304-05.
84. See infra Part IV.
85.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 304.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 3, at 780.
90. 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 105 (1981).
91. Id.
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Important to note is the intention of Marshall in abolishing the practice
of seriatim opinions. At the time of his ascension to Chief Justice, the judiciary was not only the weakest branch of the government, it was also the
only branch remaining in the hands of Jefferson and the Republican’s rival,
the Federalists.92 Marshall wanted to build the power of the judiciary so as
to put it on equal footing with the other branches of the government.93 “He
saw the termination of seriatim opinions as one step toward achieving that
goal.”94 Ultimately, Marshall and the Federalists won this battle, and in so
doing, “buil[t] much of what we recognize as the American legal system.”95
But was this the correct action?
Jefferson’s praise of the practice of seriatim opinions is enlightening in
this regard. Jefferson saw the practice of seriatim opinions as the correct
approach for four reasons:
(1) it increased transparency and led to more accountability, (2) it showed that each judge had considered and understood the case, (3) it gave more or less weight to a
precedent based on the vote of the judges, (4) and it allowed judges in the future to overrule bad law based on the
reasoning of their predecessors.96
These reasons for his belief in seriatim opinions mirrored his fears of allowing the Court to issue one unified opinion.97
He was worried about insulating judges from criticism and hiding behind an opinion.98 He was worried about judges avoiding difficult cases,
acknowledging that forcing a judge to draft an opinion proved that, to at
least some degree, the judge had considered the case and reasoned it
through.99 He was worried that all rulings would be given the same weight
through precedent, regardless of the “votes” of the judges.100 And lastly, he
92. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 3, at 780.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 305.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 306-07.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Henderson, supra note 80, at 306-07. Precedent is important, but in order
for it to be given proper weight, the soundness of decisions must be called into question. Is it
not a valid point that the number of judges deciding in a particular fashion has a direct impact on how sound that ruling is and how much support it had, and thus, should receive? As
one social anthropologist has put it:
Regularity is what law in the legal sense has in common with
law in the scientific sense. Regularity, it must be warned, does
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was worried about “bad law” having more authority and being more difficult to overcome.101
While the Court no longer speaks with only one unanimous opinion all
of the time,102 and has rather become “a hybrid, in which an opinion of a
majority of the [C]ourt is issued, but judges” can still choose to issue a separate opinion,103 are these not still valid concerns? A look at the practice of
separate opinions still in effect in England today sheds light on the fact that
not all people have dismissed Jefferson’s concerns, and could help to show
that not only are seriatim opinions a good practice, but that the Law of Citations was not far off of the mark.
IV.

ENGLAND AND THE CONTINUED PRACTICE OF SEPARATE OPINIONS

The Supreme Court of the United States is not the only court to have
dealt with the idea of seriatim opinions, far from it in fact. As stated previously, the idea of seriatim opinions was not a novel one. It was, in fact,
borrowed from the legal traditions our founding fathers were most familiar
with, those of England.104 While this practice has been done away with in
the United States, or at least changed into what Henderson coined a “hybrid,”105 the “practice of issuing separate or ‘seriatim’ opinions remains
common in England today.”106
For nearly the entirety of the history of the courts of England, the use
of seriatim opinions has pervaded.107 While these were not always written
not mean absolute certainty. There can be no true certainty
where human beings enter. . . . In law, the doctrine of
precedent is not the unique possession of the Anglo-American
common-law jurist . . . . [P]rimitive law also builds on precedents, for there, too, new decisions rest on old rules of law or
norms of custom, and new decisions which are sound tend to
supply the foundations of future action.
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
DYNAMICS 28 (1954).
101. See Henderson, supra note 80, at 306-07. Jefferson noted that in England there
were occasions “in which decisions had occasionally been overruled based on ‘dissents’ in
previous seriatim opinions.” Id. This exact idea will be discussed later. See infra Part VI.B.
102.
For instance, in the first year of the Court after Chief Justice Roberts received
his appointment, fifty-four percent of all decisions rendered were unanimous. Jeffrey Rosen,
Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2007, available at http://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2007/01/roberts-apos-s-rules/5559/.
103.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 292.
104. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 3, at 779-80.
105.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 292.
106. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 3, at 780.
107.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 292-303.
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opinions, especially since opinions were not published until the early seventeenth century, these separate opinions were often “delivered orally by each
judge . . . without any prior intracourt consultation.”108
However, William Murray, better known as “Lord Mansfield,”109 did
away with this practice in 1756.110 Lord Mansfield began the practice of the
court meeting in private, coming to one decision, and then authoring and
delivering a unanimous opinion.111 Lord Mansfield was attempting to align
England with the practices in other countries, specifically with regards to
commercial law.112
Unfortunately for Lord Mansfield, this practice was short-lived, and
upon his retirement, judges returned to issuing seriatim opinions.113 This
decision was made by Lord Kenyon, a firm believer in traditional common
law approaches and a man who preferred to decide cases on a factual basis,
case-by-case, as opposed to relying upon “broad legal rules.”114
This practice is still in effect in England today by all except the Law
Lords “who serve as the Supreme Court of Great Britain in some cases
. . . .”115 The preservation of seriatim opinions in England today serves as a
shining example of what Jefferson believed to be the greatest check on the
Supreme Court of the United States.116
If England still recognizes the power and benefits of seriatim opinions,
then perhaps this helps to prove that the Law of Citations and the early Supreme Court were not far off the mark. But this alone is not proof enough.
The Supreme Court of the United States and its practices must be looked to
in order to validate the “low point of Roman jurisprudence . . . .”117 But
first, a look at modern thoughts on individual opinions could be helpful, and
for that, this Comment turns to the opinions of the current Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, John Roberts.
V.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND HIS THOUGHTS ON MULTIPLE
OPINIONS

Upon his ascension to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Roberts “stated that one of his top priorities was to reduce the number of dis108. Id. at 292.
109. Id. at 294.
110. Id. This was the year that Lord Mansfield was appointed to the position of Lord
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. Id.
111. Id.
112. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 133 (3rd ed. 2005).
113.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 302.
114. Id. at 303.
115. Id. at 303 n.90.
116. Id. at 305-07.
117. WATSON, supra note 4, at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
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senting opinions issued by members of the Court.”118 It is Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion that the Court speaking with one voice is more respected,
stabilizes the law, and makes decisions harder to overturn.119
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Roberts looks to Chief Justice Marshall
to find support for a unified Court, brushing off Jefferson as a philosopher
and academic.120 “If the Court in Marshall’s era had issued decisions in
important cases the way this Court has over the past thirty years, we would
not have a Supreme Court today of the sort that we have . . . .”121 This is
entirely true. Chief Justice Marshall changed the face of the judiciary, but
was it, as Chief Justice Roberts believes, for the better?
Chief Justice Roberts has also attempted to discourage his fellow justices from issuing separate opinions in his effort to unify the Court.122 Chief
Justice Roberts has noted that during Chief Justice Marshall’s tenure there
were not a lot of concurring or dissenting opinions, something that is not
true with today’s Court.123 It is Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion that if the
Court could avoid nine separate opinions, there would be “a commitment
on the part of the Court to [act] as a Court, rather than being more concerned about the consistency and coherency of an individual judicial
record.”124
But Chief Justice Roberts misses the mark. He brushes off the concerns of Jefferson; in fact, he advocates for the Court’s decisions to be more
difficult to overturn, which is the exact opposite of one of Jefferson’s concerns.125 But the decisions of the Supreme Court are not static; they are
subject to change and the ever-evolving state of society in the United
States.
As such, insisting on a unified view for the Court, especially when it
would make it more difficult for constitutional law to evolve, ignores a fundamental aspect of existence—change—and society’s ability to adapt to it.
In support of this idea, and to show the importance of additional rationales
and separate opinions, examples of important concurrences and dissents
must be considered.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Henderson, supra note 80, at 283.
See Rosen, supra note 102.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Rosen, supra note 102, at 106.
Id. at 105.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDITIONAL RATIONALES

EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT HISTORICAL CONCURRENCES

One important concurrence in Supreme Court history can be found in
the case Katz v. United States,126 which was authored by Justice Harlan.127
In Katz, the majority of the Court rejected the concept that for a search to
occur there must be a physical intrusion, noting rather, that the “Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”128 However, it was Justice Harlan
who formulated the current Fourth Amendment framework when it comes
to unlawful searches and the reasonable expectation of privacy.129 Harlan
articulated the test thusly: “[It is] [m]y understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”130 This concurrence is important because it was the
first to articulate a test and describe the Fourth Amendment’s concern with
privacy outside the context of property interests.131
Perhaps the most important concurrence of all time is that of Justice
Brandeis in the case of Whitney v. California.132 In Whitney, by a 9-0 vote,
the majority upheld a conviction for violation of the Criminal Syndicalism
Act of California, giving a great deal of deference to the legislature and
concluding that there was no need for any imminence in harm.133 While his
opinion concurs with the majority, Justice Brandeis’s opinion sounds very
close to a dissenting opinion. The only reason it appears to be a concurrence
is because the majority did not contend that there was a clear and present
danger.134 The test that Justice Brandeis seems to employ is that of a “clear
and present danger,” however, he puts an interesting spin on it.135 In essence, Justice Brandeis opines that the response to evil speech is more
speech, or counter speech, and that no danger flowing from speech can be
126.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
127. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 351-53 (majority opinion).
129. Aubrey H. Brown III, Note, Georgia v. Randolph, The Red-Headed Stepchild of
an Ugly Family: Why Third-Party Consent Search Doctrine is an Unfortunate Fourth
Amendment Development that Should be Restrained, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 471, 491
(2009).
130. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
131.
Brown, supra note 129, at 487.
132.
274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
133. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366-72 (majority opinion).
134. See id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
135. See id.

2010]

THE LAW OF CITATIONS

33

considered clear and present if there is full opportunity for discussion.136
Thus, in order for speech to be unprotected, the harm flowing from such
speech must not only be highly probable, but also highly imminent.137
This concurrence is very important and has been viewed as one of the
most speech protective opinions ever written and still guides First Amendment jurisprudence to this day.138 In fact, there are those that consider this
concurrence to be “the most important essay ever written, on or off the
bench, on the meaning of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”139
B.

EXAMPLES OF IMPORTANT HISTORICAL DISSENTS

Two important historical dissents can be found in Bowers v. Hardwick.140 In Bowers, the majority held that the United States Constitution
does not confer a right to engage in homosexual sodomy,141 a narrow definition of the issue at hand. Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion attacks
the majority’s narrow interpretation of the issue.142 In Justice Blackmun’s
view, “this case is about ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’”143 In
light of this, Justice Blackmun stated,
I can only hope that . . . the Court soon will reconsider its
analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the
right to choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values
most deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of
nonconformity could ever do.144
Justice Stevens followed this dissent with a dissent of his own, noting in
large part that prior cases had laid out two clear principles: (1) that a state
viewing a practice as immoral is not enough to uphold a statute passed by
that state, and (2) that decisions concerning intimate relationships made by
both married and unmarried people constitute liberty and are protected under the Constitution.145
136. See id. at 375.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
139. Id. at 668.
140.
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
141. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, at 190.
142. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
144. Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Less than twenty years after Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court
explicitly overruled that prior decision in the case of Lawrence v. Texas.146
In Lawrence, the majority held that the Court in Bowers construed the issue
too narrowly, and noted that not only was the majority’s viewpoint a “misapprehen[sion] [of] the liberty claim presented to it,”147 but society had
also changed.148 The Court went on to state that “Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”149
These dissents from Bowers are important because they show that both societal views and jurisprudence can change, thus changing the laws of the
United States, and a dissenting opinion by a Justice, foreshadowing or facilitating those changes, can provide guidance to the Court today.
Dissenting opinions can also foreshadow future legislation and rulemaking. Such a dissent can be seen as far back as in the case of Dred Scott
v. Sandford.150 In Dred Scott, the majority held that black men were not
considered citizens within the meaning of the Constitution and, as such,
were not afforded any of the rights that citizens enjoyed, including the ability to sue in federal court.151 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not
have jurisdiction.152 Despite this finding, the majority ruled on the merits of
the case anyway, concluding that Congress could not prohibit citizens from
owning slaves.153
Two justices dissented from this opinion, Justices McLean154 and Cur155
tis. Both Justices criticized the majority for passing judgment on the case
after determining that there was no jurisdiction.156 Justice McLean went on
to argue that there was no constitutional basis for which to find that black
men were not citizens.157 He reasoned that since women and minors could
sue in federal court, despite not having the right to vote, so too could anyone who was permanently domiciled in a state “under whose laws his rights
146.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
147. Id. at 559.
148. Id. (“The 25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are
reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those
States, including Texas, that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or heterosexual
conduct), there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in
private.”).
149. Id. at 578.
150.
60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amends. XIII & XIV.
151. Id. at 422-23.
152. Id. at 427.
153. Id. at 452-54.
154. See id. at 529-64 (McLean, J., dissenting).
155. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 564-633 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 529-633 (McLean, J., and Curtis, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 532 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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[were] protected, and to which he owe[d] allegiance.”158 It is Justice Curtis’s dissent however, that has been most remembered from this case, possibly because of its length—a sizable seventy pages—but even more likely
because of political reasons.159 Regardless of the reasons Justice Curtis’s
dissent is better known, therein, Justice Curtis argued that Scott was a free
man and citizen of the United States because “free native-born citizens of
each State are citizens of the United States.”160 He then went on to argue
that “free colored persons born within some of the States are citizens of
those States, [therefore,] such persons are also citizens of the United
States.”161
While these dissents were not adopted by a later Court, they were vindicated—at least as to the issue of citizenship for black men—when the
majority decision was superseded by the Thirteenth162 and Fourteenth163
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The amendments were ratified in 1865164 and 1868,165 less than fifteen years after the decision in Dred
Scott.166 As such these dissents foreshadowed and displayed the changing
political and social climate in the United States, making them incredibly
important from a historical context.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, perhaps the ancient Romans were not as far off the
mark as many believe when they created the Law of Citations. Additionally, perhaps the Supreme Court of the United States—with the relatively
158.
159.

Id. at 530-31.
As one author has put it:
The Curtis dissent was reprinted and distributed throughout the
North during the election campaigns from 1857 until the presidential election of 1860. Curtis was not known to be antislavery; indeed, he was considered to be a proslavery doughface.
His political ties were to the conservative Boston merchants,
known as “Cotton Whigs,” who were deeply interested in a
steady source of cotton for their factories and utterly unconcerned about the nature of the labor that produced the cotton.
Thus, Curtis’s vigorous assault on Taney’s opinion was a welcome surprise to Republicans and other opponents of slavery.
Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court Politician, 62
VAND. L. REV. 519, 561-62 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
160. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 588 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 588.
162.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
163.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
164.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
165.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
166. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393.
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recent dramatic increase in the number of concurring and dissenting opinions being penned—is also on the right track. Specifically, for the Law of
Citations, the workings of five very well-respected jurists were relied upon
in a majority-rules fashion, a method that left room for debate. The fact that
the Law of Citations may not have been as bad as many have thought can
also be seen with the issuance of seriatim opinions, a practice that was
halted early in the life of the United States Supreme Court. However, the
recent rise in separate opinions, the importance of historical dissents and
concurrences, and the continued existence of seriatim opinions in England
show that the early Supreme Court and the ancient Romans were, quite
possibly, visionaries, seeing the need for multiple opinions and viewpoints.
It is also likely that these same factors act as a counter to the recent comments made by Chief Justice John Roberts with regards to doing away with,
or at least strongly limiting, the issuance of separate opinions. As such,
opinions on the Law of Citations and seriatim opinions should be revisited
in an attempt to see that these early legal minds were visionaries, way ahead
of their time.

